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Public Oversight Board
FOREWORD
It is a pleasure to present this tenth annual report o f the Public Oversight Board. The year just ended has been a good one both for the SEC Practice Section and the Board.  The Board last December spent considerable time reviewing the first ten years of the 
Section’s self-regulatory program and the Board’s oversight of it. It concluded that the program 
is functioning quite well and that it has demonstrably raised the quality of auditing practice 
among its members.
However, the Board concluded that measures should be taken to strengthen the program 
and the functioning and role of the Board; these measures are detailed later in this report. 
Briefly, they principally entail greater hands-on oversight by Board members and more exposure 
of the program through public appearances, both within the profession and outside, articles 
and other measures to enhance visibility.
The Board has observed with satisfaction the increasing success of the program. This is 
directly attributable to the dedication of the pioneers who designed the program and those 
who have contributed generously of their time to implement it by serving on committees in an 
exemplary fashion.
To honor those who have made singular and outstanding contributions to the success of 
this program and other efforts that have improved the quality of audit practice, the Board has 
instituted an award, named after one of those pioneers of this effort, the first chairman of the 
Public Oversight Board, the distinguished public servant John J. McCloy, to be given annually 
to one or more of that number. The first such award will be made before year end.
Speaking more generally, the Board commends the profession for the significant strides 
made during the past year in strengthening the accounting profession and its practices. The 
membership of the AICPA overwhelmingly approved the recommendations of the Special 
Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants (the 
Anderson Committee). These recommendations, which will bring about a restructuring of the 
profession’s code of ethics, an upgrading of its minimum educational requirements, and a 
mandatory program to monitor the quality of professional performance for all AICPA 
members, assure that the profession will be equipped to meet the challenges of the remainder 
of this century and the beginning of the next.
Similarly, the nine so-called “ expectation gap” standards promulgated by the Auditing 
Standards Board indeed do go far to close the gap between the public understanding of the role 
of auditors and auditing and the profession’s perception of its responsibilities. These will 
enhance the likelihood that auditors will uncover frauds, strengthen the increasingly important 
relationship between auditors and the audit committees of their clients, and assure further that 
client internal controls are adequate.
We congratulate all those who have contributed to these achievements.
There are, however, clouds on the horizon that trouble the Board.
The Board strongly believes that the current structure of the self-regulatory program of 
the accounting profession has been a singular success. This effort has included the establishment 
of accounting principles by a privately organized and privately funded body, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. Because of its strong belief in self-regulation of the profession, 
the POB is concerned about the rising hostility in some quarters toward the FASB because of 
some controversial statements it has issued.
The FASB was born in an atmosphere described in the Report o f the Study on 
Establishing of Accounting Principles (its recommendations resulted in the organization of the 
FASB) as one “ marked by contention approaching rancor among those outside the government 
who are involved in the financial reporting process.” That atmosphere is again with us.
At the banquet which marked the organization o f the FASB, Reginald Jones, then 
chairman and chief executive officer of General Electric Corp., urged his colleagues in industry 
to support the Board and its work, and warned that the test of their support would come when 
the Board moved into controversial areas and highly revered oxen began to be gored. The 
undersigned in 1974 while a Commissioner o f the Securities and Exchange Commission said,
“ ... it is imperative tha t everyone recognize the authority o f the Board and accord its 
determinations preeminent status. In  a field  tha t has been characterized by 
considerable latitude in the treatment o f accounting principles it may be difficult 
for many to accept the primacy o f Board pronouncements. To them I  would ask 
whether they wish to contribute to the failure o f the Board and all tha t would 
follow from  that.”
Establishing accounting standards and principles for financial reporting is inevitably a 
complex process. Issues will arise about which reasonable people will disagree. Obviously, the 
process must take into account the views of all interested groups — professional accountants, 
financial officers in industry, academic scholars, and others.
There is, however, no more reason now than there was in 1972 when the Study on 
Establishment o f Accounting Principles considered the alternatives to believe that the quality of 
standard setting would be better or more efficient if it were done by the SEC or another 
governmental body, and there is no reason to believe that another privately organized body, if 
it did its job properly, would be any less subject to controversy than the present body. We urge 
continued support for the FASB and a renewed effort on the part of all concerned with its work 
to strengthen this important institution.
Another matter which has engaged the attention of the Board almost since the beginning 
of its existence has been the relationship between auditing and consulting practices conducted 
by members within the same firm and sometimes for the same client.
Recent publicity has suggested growing tensions between those engaged in auditing 
practice and consulting practice of some firms. The Board, of course, is in no position to assess 
the sources of these tensions or the merits of the assertions by interested persons. However, the 
Board urges member firms to make clear that, notwithstanding the growth of consulting 
practices, they are first and foremost auditing firms, committed to the standards of the 
accounting profession and the auditing process, and that no amount of internal discord will 
dilute the primacy of the audit portion of their practice. A failure to do so can only result in 
heightening the perception problem described in the Board sponsored study, the results of 
which were published in November 1986, Key Publics’ Perceptions of the Management Advisory 
Services Issues.
The Board looks forward to its continuing oversight o f the SEC Practice Section’s worthy 
and proven worthwhile program and is planning and acting to assure the continued and 
enhanced effectiveness of it.
Respectfully submitted,
A. A. Sommer, Jr.
Chairman, Public Oversight Board
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American Institute o f Certified Public Accountants
REPORT OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
We are pleased to report that during the year ended June 30, 1988, the Public Oversight 
Board implemented its mandate, as enumerated in the Organizational Structure and Functions 
Document o f the SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, by conducting a comprehensive program of oversight of the 
activities of the Section.
In carrying out our assigned responsibilities to represent the public interest in the SEC 
Practice Section’s self-regulatory program, members of our staff, usually accompanied by one or 
more Board members, have attended and, as appropriate, participated in all m eetings of the 
Executive, Planning, Peer Review, and Special Investigations Committees of the Section.
We have reviewed the standards for performing and reporting on peer reviews, as revised, 
and the materials developed to train those who conduct reviews, and have tested compliance 
with those standards through application of our visitation, workpaper, and report review 
programs.
We have reviewed the operation of the Special Investigations Committee to ascertain 
whether its activities are conducted with the public interest as its primary purpose. We followed 
the Committee’s inquiries into all cases reported by member firms, including attendance at a 
majority of its task force meetings with firms reporting litigation at which inquiry was made 
concerning the quality control implications of cases.
We have monitored the follow-up actions taken by the Peer Review and Special 
Investigations Committees to assure that member firms take the required corrective actions to 
eliminate quality control deficiencies.
We have monitored and evaluated the activities of the Section’s Executive Committee 
and the Planning Subcommittee thereof, including but not limited to the propriety of policies 
and procedures for Section activities, the adequacy of membership requirements, and the 
appointments of persons to the Section’s committees and task forces.
In our opinion, the programs of the SEC Practice Section are suitably comprehensive and 
operating in a manner that reasonably assures a high quality of accounting and auditing practice 
of its member firms. Nevertheless, as commented on in the discussion section that follows, we 
have noted areas in which the Section’s programs can be improved or operated more effectively. 
Consistent with our charge, such matters have been communicated to officials of the Section.
June 30, 1988
TH E PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
A. A. SOMMER, JR., Chairman
ROBERT K. MAUTZ, Vice Chairman
MELVIN R. LAIRD
PAUL W. Mc CRACKEN
DISCUSSIO N OF BOARD ACTIVITIES
July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988
R eaders of past reports of the Board will notice a different format this year. In prior reports, the Board reported extensively on 
the activities of the SEC Practice Section 
as well as on its oversight activities.
At our suggestion, this year the 
Section itself is reporting publicly for the 
first time on its operations and the results 
of its peer review, special investigative, 
and other activities. Thus, this tenth 
annual report of the Board is to be read 
in conjunction with the Section’s first 
annual report.
R o le  o f  th e  B o a r d
The Board monitors and evaluates the 
activities of the SEC Practice Section and 
makes recommendations for improving 
the operation of the Section and the 
effectiveness of its programs. The Board is 
independent of the AICPA and the 
Section and consists of five individuals 
representing a broad spectrum of business 
and professional experience. The Board 
appoints its own members and chairman 
and establishes its own compensation and 
operating procedures.
The primary responsibility of the 
Board is to assure that the public interest 
is not neglected when the Section sets 
standards, membership requirements, 
rules, and procedures. The Board, assisted 
by its legal counsel, a staff of four CPAs, 
and two administrative assistants, 
discharges its responsibilities through 
application of extensive oversight
procedures to all phases of the Section’s 
activities.
■ Reassessm ent o f  the Program .
In this the tenth year of its existence, 
the Board took the opportunity to step 
back and assess, at a two-day “retreat,” 
not only the Board’s role and operation, 
but also the entire process which it 
oversees.
In preparation for that meeting, the 
Board solicited comments from both 
critics and proponents of the program. 
Commentators were encouraged to 
interpret the solicitation broadly, to 
forward suggestions that would benefit 
the program’s peer review and special 
investigative processes as well as the work 
of the Board. Comments were received 
from over 100 persons; copies of the 
respondents’ letters were distributed to 
Board members, discussed at the 
“retreat,” and considered in deciding 
future courses o f action.
O f the many suggestions offered 
regarding the operations of the Section, 
the Board endorsed those it considered to 
be in the public interest, implemented 
those that pertained to its own operations, 
and forwarded several recommendations 
to the Section for its consideration and 
possible adoption. These are commented 
on in appropriate sections of this report.
While some commentators suggested 
that the Board seek line authority, the vast 
majority concurred that the granting of 
line authority to the Board would be 
counter to the concept of self-regulation. 
The Board reaffirmed its belief that its
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appropriate role is one of oversight and 
that line authority would diminish rather 
than enhance its effectiveness.
■  Scope o f  Board O versight. The
Board also considered suggestions that 
it extend its oversight to other of the 
accounting profession’s self-regulatory 
programs. The Board concluded that 
formal oversight responsibility over such 
other programs was outside its purview 
but that, in its concern for the public 
interest, the Board should more 
intensively monitor those programs that 
affect the quality of independent auditing.
Accordingly, the Board intends to 
review and comment on proposed 
revisions to professional standards when, 
in its judgment, to do so would be in the 
public interest. Such activity will not be 
entirely new to the Board. In the past, the 
Board has commented on such matters 
as the exposure draft o f the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting and the SEC’s proposal for 
mandatory peer review.
In addition, the Board will continue 
to meet periodically with representatives 
of the profession’s standard-setting bodies 
to discuss matters of mutual concern. It 
has directed its staff to monitor, analyze, 
and report to the Board on proposed 
standards. The Board has also asked its 
staff to report major developments in the 
operations of state boards of accountancy, 
whose positive enforcement programs 
have objectives similar to those of the 
Section.
■  The John J. M cC loy Award
Program . The Board has initiated a 
program to honor those who have made 
significant 
contributions to 
strengthening 
audit quality 
control and 
effectiveness in 
the United 
States. The 
Board believes 
that persons 
who contribute 
significantly to 
that process 
deserve 
recognition.
The award is 
named in honor 
of John J.
McCloy, the first 
chairman of the 
POB, who has 
had a long and 
distinguished 
record of public 
service. The 
Board intends to 
make the first 
award in 1988.
The working clay model of the John 
J. McCloy Award being sculpted by 
Dennis Smith of Salt Lake City. 
Many of Mr. Smith’s figures 
accentuate plazas and the entrances 
to major buildings in various parts 
of the country.
Oversight o f  the Peer Review  
Process
■  V isib ility  o f  the Board. The
Board is sensitive to the repeated 
criticism that the Board and the Section 
are virtually unknown to the public and 
not sufficiently well-known even within 
the accounting profession. In response, 
the Board adopted a wide-ranging 
program to increase its visibility.
The accompanying chart on page 18 
summarizes the personal involvement of 
Board members in overseeing the activities 
of the program.
Because the Board believes the peer 
review process is the foundation for the 
Section’s self-regulatory program, it 
monitors that process closely. The Board 
and its staff closely monitor not only the 
performance of the Peer Review Com­
mittee in setting standards and processing 
reports but also the performance of 
independent peer review teams as they 
comprehensively review the appropriate­
ness of the quality control systems of 
member firms and compliance by the
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firms’ personnel with stated policies and 
procedures.
■ Types o f  O versight Program s.
The Board’s oversight o f the peer 
review process involves staff review of 
every peer review performed by the 
Section, pursuant to one of the POB’s 
three oversight programs. These programs, 
which are designed to evaluate whether 
review teams understood and complied 
with peer review performance and re­
porting standards in completing their 
reviews, are as follows:
□  Visitation and workpaper review 
program—This involves observation 
of the performance of field work, 
attendance at the exit conference 
during which the review team reports 
its findings and recommendations to 
management of the reviewed firm, and 
review of the review team’s workpapers 
and reports and the reviewed firm’s 
response.
□  Workpaper review program—This 
consists of the review of the review 
team’s workpapers and reports and the 
firm’s response.
□  Report review program—This entails 
review of selected portions of the 
review team’s workpapers, its reports, 
and the firm’s response.
Since it is unnecessary and not cost 
beneficial to subject every peer review to 
intensive oversight, the Board determines 
which oversight program to apply to each 
review based upon certain attributes of 
the firms to be reviewed and the review 
teams:
□  Attributes of the firm  to be reviewed:
■ Number of SEC registrants audited.
■ Size of firm.
■ Type of report issued on the firm’s 
prior review.
■ Number of times peer reviewed.
■ Type of POB oversight program 
applied to prior review.
□  Attributes of the review team:
■ Performance on prior reviews.
■ Experience of review team in relation 
to the nature, size, and complexity 
of the practice of the reviewed firm.
Some reviews, such as those of firms 
that audit five or more SEC registrants, 
are automatically subjected to visitation 
and workpaper review oversight. The type 
of oversight program assigned to other 
reviews is on a stratified, random basis. 
Application of this assignment process 
resulted in the following:
Percent of 
SECPS Firms 
Reviewed 
in 1987
Type o f
POB Oversight Program
Visitation and Workpaper 
Review Program................. . . . 34%
Workpaper Review Program. . . . 44%
Report Review Program....... .. . 22%
Additional details are shown in the 
chart on page 9.
The review of a multi-office firm, 
pursuant to the visitation-observation 
workpaper review program, requires POB 
staff to observe the performance of the 
review team at one or more of the re­
viewed firm’s operating offices, to attend 
exit conferences held in conjunction 
therewith, and to attend the final 
conference at which the overall review 
findings are reported to top management. 
As a result, during the 1987 review year, 
POB staff members, at times accompanied 
by a Board member, attended 75 
operating office and final exit conferences 
held in conjunction with the review's of 
57 firms.
■ E valuation  o f  Ind iv idual Peer 
R eview  R eports. One or more 
Board members attended five of the six 
meetings of the Peer Review Committee; 
staff members of the Board attended all 
such meetings. The Peer Review Com­
mittee evaluates each report to determine 
whether the review team appropriately 
applied peer review standards. Each 
evaluation is based in part on the review, 
conducted by the Committee’s staff 
members, of some or all of the review
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Scope o f  PO B O versight o f  1987 Peer Reviews C lassified by N um ber o f  
SEC R egistrants A udited  by R eview ed Firm
    Workpaper ReviewWorkpaper Review     Report Review
100%  2 FIRMS
—  60 Firms-------------------
with 1 to 4 SEC Clients15 Firms  
with 5 or more 
SEC Clients
39
FIRMS
team’s workpapers and reports.
During its deliberations, the Com­
mittee is made aware of the findings and 
conclusions of the POB staff, based on the 
application of the oversight programs 
described above. The Board’s staff  
occasionally finds it necessary to question 
the adequacy of a review team’s 
performance or its application of peer 
review standards. In virtually all such 
cases, the Committee arrives at similar 
conclusions.
Unresolved differences of opinion 
between the POB staff and a committee of 
the Section are rare, but when one occurs 
it receives attention at the next Board 
meeting. The chairman and other 
representatives o f the relevant committee 
are invited, at their option, to attend a 
subsequent meeting of the Board to 
present the basis for the Committee’s 
judgment.
The infrequency with which such 
differences in professional judgment occur 
between Board staff and a committee of 
the Section suggest that the peer review 
program is working well. The com­
mitment and dedication of the members
of the Peer Review Committee are in large 
part responsible for the program’s success 
and the Board’s and the SEC’s endorse­
ment of the program.
Ultimately, however, the success of 
the program is dependent on the support 
of member firms and their commitment 
to quality service, which in turn depends 
on the importance that managements of 
member firms attach to the process. While 
all firms report results of the peer review 
to their partners and professional staff, 
some smaller firms assemble their entire 
professional and administrative staffs at 
the exit conference to be informed o f the 
review team’s findings and of the firm’s 
plans for corrective action, if applicable. 
The Board encourages such broad-based 
reporting.
■  M on itorin g  F ollow -up  A ctions  
o f  the Peer R eview  C om m ittee.
In addition to monitoring the Com­
mittee’s processing of individual peer 
review reports, the Board and its staff 
monitor the Committee’s actions in 
obtaining assurance that a firm 
implements any corrective measures
------------------- 93 Firms-----------------
with no SEC Clients
23
FIRMS
35
FIRMS
35
FIRMS
19
FIRMS
15
FIRMS
75
50
25
0
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deemed necessary, such as revising its 
quality control system to correct 
significant design deficiencies or initiating 
procedures to assure greater compliance 
by the firm’s personnel with the system.
In such cases, the Committee, as a 
condition for accepting the peer review 
report, will require the firm not only to 
take specified corrective actions but to 
provide evidence that the actions have 
been effectively implemented. In each 
such case during the year covered by this 
report, the subject firm agreed to do so.
This type of action is analogous to a 
“ consent agreement’’ entered into by a 
firm with the SEC. If a firm does not 
consent to take the action considered 
necessary, the Committee would 
recommend that the Executive Com­
mittee initiate formal sanction proceedings 
against the firm. The Committee is to be 
commended for its insistence that firms 
whose systems are found to be in need of 
significant improvement provide the 
Committee with evidence that appropriate 
and effective corrective actions have been 
implemented.
POB Chairman A l 
Sommer makes a 
point a t luncheon 
break to Ernst &  
Whinney Chairman 
Ray Groves, POB 
Counsel Dick Stark, 
and POB Member 
Paul McCracken.
■ T im ely Processing o f  R eview s.
While the majority of peer review 
reports are processed within reasonable 
time limits, some reports remain unpro­
cessed for several months after the exit 
conferences are held. At June 30, 1988, 
seven reports on 1987 peer reviews were 
not yet processed; similar conditions 
existed at June 30 in each of the two 
preceding years. The majority of these
□  10
reports are of reviews of firms whose 
quality control systems were found to 
have significant deficiencies. The Board 
continues to be concerned with such 
delays because of the considerable length 
o f time that transpires between the time a 
review team discovers significant deficien­
cies in the firm’s quality control system 
and the implementation o f corrective 
actions by the firm. The Board again urges 
the Committee to examine its processing 
and administrative procedures to effect 
more expeditious processing of problem 
reviews.
■  Peer R eview  Standards. The
standards for performing and report­
ing on peer reviews have undergone con­
tinuing review and revision during the ten 
years that the program has been in existence.
During the course of its “ retreat,’’ 
the Board reviewed the standards and 
concluded that they were effective and 
being uniformly and equitably applied by 
peer review teams and by the Committee. 
The only recommendation that the Board 
made during the year with respect to the 
peer review process was that the Section 
consider requiring a peer review report or 
letter of comments to identify an office of 
a multi-office firm that was found to be in 
substantial non-compliance with the 
firm’s policies and procedures. The 
Section has placed the matter on its 
agenda for consideration.
■  Im provem ents in  Q uality o f
Practice. The Board remains
convinced o f the value of triennial peer 
review. One hundred and thirty nine of 
the 168 firms peer reviewed in 1987 had 
been reviewed at least once before. 
However, only 128,* or 92% of such 
firms, received an unqualified report; 11,* 
or 8% of them, did not. Despite the 
discipline imposed by inspection programs 
and other quality control monitoring 
procedures, deterioration in the quality of 
practice in some firms apparently can go 
undetected until it is discovered in a peer 
review. Such may have been the case for 
nine of eleven firms that received 
unqualified reports on their immediately 
preceding reviews but modified reports on
* These numbers include reports processed by the Com­
mittee and the staff’s evaluation of the types of reports 
that are expected to be accepted on the seven reports 
not processed at June 30, 1988.
The “expectation 
g a p ” auditing 
standards were the 
pi mary topic of a 
meeting of the POB 
with representatives 
of the Auditing 
Standards Board. 
(Left to right) POB 
Technical Director 
Chuck Evers, POB 
Vice Chairman Bob 
M autz, POB 
Member Paul 
McCracken, POB 
C h a irm an A l 
Sommer, ASB 
C h a irm an Jerry 
Sullivan, and 
AICPA Vice 
President Dan Guy.
their reviews performed in 1987.
Our staff analyzed the deficiencies 
reported in the letters of comments 
accompanying peer review reports issued 
in 1987 and compared them to those 
reported in earlier years. The results were 
generally positive. A number of findings 
were similar to those noted in the analysis 
of letters of comments issued on peer 
reviews performed in 1986. A few new 
findings warrant attention.
The average number of deficiencies 
identified per firm was lower in 1987 than 
the average number identified in this 
group’s prior letters o f comments (most of 
which were issued in 1984). Marked 
improvements were noted in docu­
mentation o f consultation and of 
performance of audit procedures relating 
to key audit areas. As also noted in the 
reviews performed in 1986, many of the 
letters of comments cited deficiencies in 
applying or documenting application of 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, 
“Audit Risk and Materiality in Con­
ducting an Audit.”
The fact that peer review teams 
emphasize compliance with recently 
promulgated professional standards is 
salutary, since it directs the attention of 
member firms to the need for timely 
implementation o f new pronouncements 
of standard-setting bodies. Such emphasis
is particularly critical at this time because 
o f the significance of the nine standards 
recently issued by the Auditing Standards 
Board to help close the so-called expec­
tation gap between what the public 
expects o f auditors and what independent 
auditors can provide.
Our analysis of letters of comments 
suggests that two other aspects of quality 
control warrant attention. Over twenty- 
five percent of the firms received letters of 
comments which cited deficiencies in their 
internal inspections, evidencing that such 
firms are not obtaining the full benefit 
to be derived from an effectively imple­
mented inspection program.
In addition, the frequency with which 
quality control issues relating to inde­
pendence appeared in 1987 letters is 
disturbing. Sixteen percent of the firms 
reviewed in 1987 had such deficiencies, 
some of which were quite significant. The 
reports o f two firms, for example, were 
qualified because of independence 
deficiencies, and there was divided 
opinion within the Committee as to 
whether the report of a third firm should 
have been modified. All three firms had 
failed to detect client situations that 
impaired their independence under the 
profession’s rules. In all three cases, 
knowledgeable professionals concluded 
that the firms were in technical violation
11 □
of the profession’s rules but noted that 
the rules are ambiguous. In all three 
cases, the audits were considered to have 
otherwise been performed in accord­
ance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. Since independence is the 
cornerstone of the attest function, 
the Board urges the Section and the 
profession to take action to educate 
members so that compliance with inde­
pendence policies and procedures will be 
enhanced and ambiguities in the rules 
eliminated.
■  M andatory Peer R eview . The
Board has continually urged firms that 
audit public clients to join the SEC 
Practice Section. Two recent actions—one 
an initiative of the profession and the 
other a proposed rule of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission—should increase 
the number of firms that will join an 
organization that has a mandatory 
triennial peer review requirement.
In January 1988, the members of the 
AICPA adopted by ballot vote a recom­
mendation of the Special Committee on 
Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Certified Public Accountants, which 
requires a firm to subject itself to a quality 
review program in order for the partners 
of the firm to be eligible for AICPA 
membership. Thus, if partners in a CPA 
firm want to be members of the Institute, 
their firm will be required to subject their 
quality control policies and procedures 
to independent review, and take any 
corrective action that such independent 
review indicates is necessary. Since 
adoption of the requirement—by a 76% 
affirmative vote—many firms have opted 
to join the Division for CPA Firms.
The SEC has under study a proposal 
that would require auditors who audit the 
financial statements of an SEC registrant 
to belong to a peer review organization 
acceptable to the Commission. The 
Board has urged the adoption of such a 
requirement and hope that by the time 
this report is published the proposed rule 
will have been adopted.
Members 
o f the 
Public 
Oversight 
Board
A. A. SOMMER, JR.,
Chairman, 1986-; joined Board 
in 1983; SEC Commissioner,
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Oversight o f  the Special 
Investigative Process
The Special Investigations Committee 
administers the other major program of 
the Section, a supplement to the peer 
review program. A member firm is 
obligated to report promptly to the SIC 
any litigation or proceeding directed 
against it that alleges failure in the conduct 
of an audit of the financial statements o f a 
publicly-held client.
The SIC is not concerned with the 
validity of such allegations nor does it 
form conclusions about the firm’s 
compliance with professional standards in 
the performance of the audit involved in 
the litigation or proceeding. Those 
determinations are properly the respon­
sibility of the regulatory authorities and 
the judicial system. However, such 
allegations may raise questions about a 
firm’s quality controls. To assure that the 
public interest is protected, the SIC’s 
responsibility is to determine whether the 
firm’s quality control system is adequately 
designed and to determine whether firm
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personnel are complying with the system.
The Board and its staff monitor the 
activities o f the SIC and have unrestricted 
access to all meetings and files. The 
Board’s staff reads the complaint, 
pertinent financial statements, other 
public documents, and relevant 
professional literature for each reported 
case. During the 1987-88 year, all SIC 
meetings were attended by one or more 
Board members and staff. Staff members, 
at times accompanied by a Board member, 
also attended (1) a substantial majority of 
the meetings during which SIC task forces 
and representatives of firms involved in 
litigation reviewed relevant documents 
and discussed the quality control 
implications o f the allegations, and (2) all 
meetings during which task forces 
discussed the results of the firm’s most 
recent peer review with the firm’s peer 
review team captain. The results of these 
monitoring procedures are reported at 
each Board meeting so as to enable the 
Board to conclude whether the SIC is 
properly fulfilling its responsibilities.
■  E nhancing C red ib ility  in  the
Process. The Board believes that
the special investigative process is effective 
and being operated in the public interest. 
Significant improvements were made in 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
process during the year, due primarily to 
the adoption of the recommendations 
made by the Task Force on SIC 
Methodology described in the Section’s 
report. The Board believes the newly- 
adopted structured approach for analysis 
of reported cases will make the Com­
mittee’s actions on individual cases more 
uniform and will enhance the effective 
discharge of the Committee’s 
responsibilities. The approach, which was 
originally recommended by the Board, 
formalizes the procedures to be followed 
in the various stages of the Committee’s 
review of a case. It also spells out with 
reasonable precision those factors that the 
Committee is to consider in deciding 
whether to proceed to the next stage of 
review or to close the file on a case.
Another significant development 
which is expected to enhance the SIC’s 
effectiveness in arriving at conclusions 
earlier regarding the quality control 
implications of the allegations is the access
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of the SIC to selected documentation of, 
and personnel involved in the audit in 
question. While a member firm has a right 
to deny access to its workpapers and 
personnel, firms are expected to cooperate 
and are cooperating when such requests 
are made. The SIC reviewed audit 
documentation in seven cases, giving it 
“ first-hand” impressions of each firm’s 
compliance with its quality control 
procedures. This approach permits the 
SIC to conclude more quickly whether 
other work of personnel responsible for 
the allegedly faulty audit needs to be 
reviewed.
Overall, member firms have 
cooperated fully, providing the SIC with 
the information it considered necessary to 
form conclusions on the quality control 
implications of reported cases.
The Board has noted that some firms 
are not complying with the requirement 
that relevant litigation or proceedings be 
reported to the Committee within thirty 
days of filing or initiation. The effective 
discharge of the Committee’s respon­
sibilities requires that the quality control 
implications of such litigation or 
proceedings be addressed in a timely 
fashion. Action should be taken to assure 
that member firms report cases within 
thirty days o f initiation as required.
■  SEC E ndorsem ent o f  the SIC
Process. While the SEC has for 
many years publicly stated its confidence 
in the integrity of the peer review process, 
it has not yet endorsed the special 
investigative process, primarily because 
the SEC staff believes it has not had 
sufficient access to the process to be able 
to form an independent opinion as to its 
effectiveness. The Board believes that SEC 
endorsement of the SIC process would 
give the process significant credibility.
To that end, the Board has worked 
strenuously to provide the SEC with 
sufficient information about the process 
without materially increasing the litigation 
risk o f the firms involved.
The SEC staff was provided summaries 
of cases for which the SIC had recently 
concluded its inquiries. While information 
regarding the SIC’s depth of inquiry and
bases for its judgments on the submitted 
closed case summaries were not con­
sidered sufficient by the SEC staff to 
permit the SEC to evaluate conclusively 
the effectiveness of the process, the SEC 
staff considered their submission as a 
positive development. The Board believes 
that the Section and the SEC will in time 
develop a mutually workable arrangement 
for SEC access that will permit the SEC to 
be able to publicly express the same degree 
of confidence in the SIC process that it 
has expressed with respect to the peer 
review process.
We believe it is important that every 
effort be made to assure that closed case 
summaries contain sufficient detail to 
afford the Commission staff to gain 
sufficient knowledge about the activities 
of the SIC and its task forces. Brevity in 
the closed case summaries is desirable to 
reduce litigation risk of member firms but 
may have led the Commission staff to 
underestimate the extent o f the SIC’s 
involvement.
Conversations with the Chief 
Accountant of the SEC have convinced 
the Board that to gain the approval of the 
Commission it is essential that the SIC 
more frequently perform procedures 
known as “ special reviews.” These are 
examinations of other audits (1) done by 
the professionals involved in the allegedly 
failed audit, (2) performed by the office 
involved, and (3) involving entities in the 
same industry. Our review of this matter 
does not suggest that the cost of such 
extended activity would be burdensome.
The Board endorses the plan of the 
Committee to have its representatives 
meet periodically with the SEC staff to 
discuss matters of mutual interest, 
including changes that the Commission 
believes would make the process more 
effective.
■  N am e o f  C om m ittee. In order to
have an effective and encompassing 
self-regulatory program and if the public 
is to be protected, the Section needs a 
process to deal with allegations of audit 
failure, especially when such allegations 
relate to audits of publicly-held 
companies. Accordingly, the Special
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On M ay 25, 1988, the POB met with the SEC in open meeting.
A POB Chairman reports on recent activities. (Left to 
right) SEC Chief Accountant Ed Coulson, SEC 
Chairman Dave Ruder, POB Chairman A l  
Sommer, and SEC Commissioner Aulana Peters.
▼ AICPA Vice President B. Z. Lee (center) with POB 
Members Bob Froehlke and Paul McCracken.
A Commissioner Aulana Peters with POB 
Member Bob Froehlke, AICPA Vice President 
Ted Barreaux, and POB Member M el Laird.
T SEC Chairman Dave Ruder with fellow 
Wisconsinites Bob Froehlke and M el Laird.
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Investigations Committee was formed.
Unfortunately, however, the name 
chosen for the Committee does not 
describe its function as it has evolved. The 
Special Investigations Committee is not 
an executory body intended to inquire 
into a challenged audit to identify possible 
deficient professional performance.
Since its establishment, the special 
investigative process has served as a 
complement and supplement to the peer 
review process. Allegations of audit failure 
are reviewed by the SIC to determine 
whether (1) professionwide auditing or 
quality control standards should be revised 
or additional guidance should be issued to 
achieve greater compliance with such 
standards; and (2) some part o f the quality 
control system of the firm reporting the 
case needs to be strengthened. The SEC’s 
Chief Accountant acknowledged publicly 
at the open meeting the Commission and 
the Board held during the year that these 
are appropriate objectives.
To more properly describe the activity 
and objective of the Committee, we 
suggest that the Section consider 
renaming the Committee to more clearly 
indicate its function and responsibility.
M embership and M embership 
Requirements
The Board commends the Section— 
and the Division for CPA Firms as a 
whole—for the significant increase 
achieved in membership during the year. 
Since the Board believes that firms that 
audit SEC registrants should become 
members o f the SEC Practice Section, it 
has recommended that the Section initiate 
a membership promotion program to 
attract firms with SEC clients to join the 
SEC Practice Section. The Section decided 
to defer action on the recommendation 
until after the SEC has acted on its staff's 
proposal for mandatory peer review.
■  C oncurring P artner R eview  
R equirem ent. Since its inception, 
the Section has required a second partner 
review of audits of public entities. The 
Board believes that a preissuance review of 
an audit engagement by a second partner 
who is knowledgeable in regulatory and 
relevant industry matters can provide the 
firm and the public with significant
FASB and POB 
members discuss 
recent developments. 
(Left to right) FASB 
Members Ray 
Lauver and Jim 
Leisenring, POB 
Member Bob 
Froehlke, FASB 
Chairman Dennis 
Bereford, and POB 
Chairman A l 
Sommer.
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additional assurance that the engagement 
was performed in compliance with 
professional standards in all material 
respects.
The Board is pleased to note that, 
based on a recommendation of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting and on suggestions 
incorporated in a recently published article 
authored by the Board’s vice chairman 
and executive director,* the Section has 
amended its membership requirement to 
define more clearly the responsibility of 
the concurring review partner and to 
make application of the second partner 
review more uniform.
The Question o f  Sanctions
A few respondents to the Board’s 
request for commentary opined that the 
self-regulatory program would not be 
considered successfu l and credible until it 
sanctioned individuals whose performance 
on audit engagements was deemed to be 
substandard. The suggestion has been 
made frequently.
The Board carefully reconsidered this 
matter and concluded that a self-regula­
tory program for firms does not and 
should not need a mechanism for sanc­
tioning individuals. Such a mechanism is 
unnecessary since it would duplicate sanc­
tioning mechanisms now in existence— 
those imposed by firms, those imposed by 
the SEC and by licensing authorities, 
those imposed by judges and juries in civil 
and criminal suits, and those imposed by 
the Professional Ethics Division of the 
AICPA and by state CPA societies. Even 
more importantly, a mechanism for sanc­
tioning individuals would establish an 
adversarial relationship between peer re­
view teams and reviewed firms, thus sub­
stantially diminishing the effectiveness of 
the process.
■ A ctions R equired o f  M em ber
Firm s. The organizational 
document o f the Section empowers only
* Mautz, Robert K. and Matusiak, Louis W., 
“ Concurring Partner Review Revisited,” Journal of 
Accountancy, March 1988.
the Executive Committee to impose 
sanctions. Sanctions enumerated in the 
document include (1) requiring firms to 
take corrective actions with respect to 
either their quality control systems or to 
their partners and staff members, (2) 
imposing additional requirements for 
continuing professional education, and 
(3) requiring firms to undergo an 
accelerated peer review or a special review.
In practice, these measures are rarely 
being imposed by the Executive Com­
mittee, but quite routinely dictated by the 
Peer Review Committee and the Special 
Investigations Committee when they 
become aware of deficiencies in a member 
firm’s quality controls or compliance 
therewith. If a firm does not consent to 
implement the actions required by either 
of these committees, the Section’s 
procedures call for initiation of formal 
sanctioning procedures.
The Board has suggested that greater 
publicity be given to the number of times 
that such informal sanctions have been 
agreed to by firms. The Board recognizes 
that the word “ sanction” has a negative 
connotation, and suggests that 
identification of the required actions 
agreed to as consent agreements or some 
other more descriptive term would further 
increase the credibility of the self- 
regulatory program.
■  Sanctions Im posed  by F irm s.
As the Board has suggested in 
previous reports, the first, and most 
effective and immediate, imposition of a 
sanction on a professional found to have 
acted unprofessionally is initiated by his or 
her fellow partners or employers. These 
actions are rarely made known outside the 
firm. The Board believes the Section 
should gather data regarding disciplinary 
actions imposed internally by firms and 
publish a summary thereof without 
identifying either firms or individuals.
Such a report coupled with public 
reporting of the number of “ consent 
agreements” entered into by firms with 
the Peer Review Committee and the 
Special Investigations Committee would 
effectively refute the allegation that the 
self-regulatory program does not impose 
sanctions.
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Sum m ary o f  B oard  M em ber A ctiv ities— July 1 ,  1987 to June 3 0 ,  1988
M eetings o f  the Board and M eetings D irect M onitoring o f  SECPS A ctiv ities
w ith Representatives o f Other O rganizations by one or more Board Members
1987 N a tu re  o f  M eetin g 1987 Type o f  A c tiv i ty
July 27 POB meeting and meeting with the Arthur September 16 Special Investigations Committee
Andersen Public Review Board meeting
September 9 POB meeting and meeting with Ray Groves, November 17 Special Investigations Committee
CEO of Ernst & Whinney meeting
November 24 POB meeting and meeting with representa­
tives of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board
December 1 Executive Committee meeting
December 3 Peer Review Committee meeting
December 15-16 POB two-day “retreat” to review ten-year December 9 Peer review exit conference
operations of the SEC Practice Section and 
the Board’s role therein 1988 Type o f  A c tiv i ty
January 7 SIC task force meeting
1988 N a tu re  o f  M eetin g January 13 SIC task force meeting
January 13 
March 21
March 30 
April 7 
May 5 
May 25
POB meeting and meeting with representa­
tives of the Auditing Standards Board
POB meeting and meeting with representa­
tives of the Special Investigations 
Committee
Meeting of POB Chairman with officers of the 
AICPA
POB meeting and meeting with AICPA Board 
of Directors
Meeting of POB Chairman with SEC Chief 
Accountant
POB meeting and open meeting with 
Securities and Exchange Commission
January 14 Special Investigations Committee 
meeting
Peer Review Committee meeting
Planning Committee meeting
Executive Committee meeting
Special Investigations Committee 
meeting
Peer Review Committee meeting
Peer Review Committee meeting
Special Investigations Committee 
meeting
Peer review exit conference
February 15-16 
February 17 
March 9 
March 23
April 8 
May 9-10 
May 26
June 24June Meetings of POB Chairman with individual 
SEC commissioners to discuss SEC’s manda­
tory peer review proposal
June 28 Executive Committee meeting
June 30 Peer Review Committee meeting
A ctivities to Increase V isib ility  o f the Board and the Section
1987 Type o f  A c tiv i ty 1988 Type o f  A c tiv i ty
September 22 Address by POB Chairman to annual meeting May 1 Address by POB Chairman to meeting of
of AICPA AICPA Council
1988 Type o f  A c tiv i ty June 16 Address by POB Chairman to regional meeting of SECPS
March Article co-authored by POB Vice Chairman 
published in Journal of Accountancy
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Conclusions
During the year, the Section made 
changes in membership requirements, 
peer review standards, and SIC operating 
procedures to increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the self-regulatory effort. 
Some of the changes were responsive to 
recommendations o f the SEC, our Board, 
and those of the National Commission 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.
Both the Peer Review and Special 
Investigations Committees conducted 
their operations with deliberation and 
professionalism and received the total 
cooperation of member firms. Particularly 
impressive is the willingness of firms to 
cooperate with the Special Investigations 
Committee in giving the Committee 
access to selected documentation of the 
audit in question.
The Executive Committee found no 
need to impose a sanction during the year, 
because all corrective actions required of 
firms under review by either the Peer Re­
view Committee or the Special Investiga­
tions Committee were undertaken 
promptly. These actions would have been 
designated as sanctions had they been 
required by the Executive Committee 
rather than the Peer Review or Special 
Investigations Committee.
During the year, the private sector has 
taken several initiatives that demonstrate 
that the accounting profession has an 
effective and encompassing self-regulatory 
program. The list of major initiatives is 
impressive:
□  October 1987 - The National Com­
mission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting, which was sponsored by 
five private sector organizations, 
recommended significant changes, 
many of which have already been 
implemented.
□  January 1988 - AICPA members 
adopted, each by a substantial majority, 
six of the recommendations of the 
Special Committee on Standards of 
Professional Conduct, the most 
important o f which is the requirement
that each AICPA member in active 
practice be affiliated with a firm that 
regularly undergoes a quality assurance 
review.
□  April 1988 - The Auditing Standards 
Board issued nine standards dealing 
with the “ expectation gap.”
These significant, professionwide, 
private sector initiatives to improve audit 
quality deservedly earned the favorable 
comments of Chairman John Dingell and 
other representatives of the Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Energy and Com­
merce. The Board joins Congressman 
Dingell and his colleagues in compliment­
ing the profession on the substantial 
progress made during the year to improve 
the equality of auditing in the United States.
We commend the Auditing Standards 
Board for adopting standards intended 
to close the “ expectation gap.” The 
standards now better define the prof­
ession’s role in assuring the credibility of 
financial reporting and, in that sense, 
represent a meaningful response to the 
concerns expressed by the Treadway Com­
mission. Based on our ten years of 
oversight of the profession’s efforts, we 
are confident that satisfactory results will 
be achieved.
All of these developments convince 
us that there is no need for additional 
government regulation of the profession 
and we are encouraged by the growing 
recognition in Washington that the 
profession responds constructively 
to proposals to improve its own 
performance.
A final note. The success of the 
Section’s program in elevating the quality 
of professional performance of member 
firms should not be allowed to breed 
complacency. As firms embark upon their 
third and fourth peer reviews, there is a 
danger that reviews and responses to them 
may become routine and mechanical. This 
would quickly translate into shortcomings 
being overlooked, standards being
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slighted, and departures from them 
remaining undiscovered. Very quickly an 
outstanding professional program could 
deteriorate and become progressively less 
relevant, performance would slip, and 
public criticism mount, resulting in public 
demands for government intervention.
All this can be avoided if those involved in 
the program—member firms, professionals 
who contribute generously o f their time 
to serve on committees, AICPA staff, and 
the Board and its staff—maintain their 
vigilance, enthusiasm, and commitment 
to the quality of the program.
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